
The Supreme Court’s striking down of the 99th Amendment (National
Judicial Appointments Commission act, NJAC) seems to confirm that Indian
institutional development follows a maxim of its own: Thou shalt meet
overreach with more overreach. The judiciary-legislature tussle in India
has never been based on first principles. A dominant executive sought
to undermine the independence of the judiciary in the 1970s. In
response, the judges created an appointments process where they could,
as Justice J. Chelameswar writes, “exult and frolic in our emancipation
from the other two organs of the state”. The legitimacy of this
arrangement, where the judiciary effectively shut out other branches of
government, was always dubious on constitutional grounds. We put up with
it because it seemed to have the effect of securing judicial
independence. But then allegations of corruption, a general sense that
the judiciary itself had become unaccountable, led to a clamour that
judges could not be the sole judges of their own cause.
Unaccountability, rather than independence, became the bigger worry.