
The Supreme Court’s striking down of the 99th Amendment (National Judicial Appointments Commission act, NJAC) seems to confirm that Indian institutional development follows a maxim of its own: Thou shalt meet overreach with more overreach. The judiciary-legislature tussle in India has never been based on first principles. A dominant executive sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary in the 1970s. In response, the judges created an appointments process where they could, as Justice J. Chelameswar writes, “exult and frolic in our emancipation from the other two organs of the state”. The legitimacy of this arrangement, where the judiciary effectively shut out other branches of government, was always dubious on constitutional grounds. We put up with it because it seemed to have the effect of securing judicial independence. But then allegations of corruption, a general sense that the judiciary itself had become unaccountable, led to a clamour that judges could not be the sole judges of their own cause. Unaccountability, rather than independence, became the bigger worry.